Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales

Laura H Baldwin, Robert Marshall and Jean-Francois Richard

Journal of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 105, issue 4, 657-99

Abstract: Allegations of bidder collusion at Forest Service timber sales in the Pacific Northwest were common in the 1970s. Of course, prices may be low for reasons other than collusion. The authors formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which they control for demand conditions. Noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold (the standard auction model) is a special case: it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion. The authors also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:105:y:1997:i:4:p:657-99

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