Contracts and Money

Boyan Jovanic and Masako Ueda

Journal of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 105, issue 4, 700-708

Abstract: Why are contracts not fully indexed? In a setting in which fully indexed contracts are feasible, the authors find that, when price-level data are gathered with delay, these contracts are not renegotiation-proof. The contracts that replace them entail a lower level of welfare for the parties to that contract. They also imply that real variables respond to nominal shocks. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262090 full text (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Contracts and Money (1996)
Working Paper: Contracts and Money (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:105:y:1997:i:4:p:700-708

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().