A Theory of Prostitution
Lena Edlund () and
Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol. 110, issue 1, 181-214
Prostitution is low-skill, labor intensive, female, and well paid. This paper proposes a marriage market explanation to this puzzle. If a prostitute compromises her marriage market prospects, she will have to be compensated for forgone marriage market opportunities. We discuss the link between poverty and prostitution and show that prostitution may decrease with male income if wives and prostitutes are drawn from the same pool of women. We point to the role of male sex ratios, and males in transit, in sustaining high levels of prostitution, and we discuss possible reasons for its low reputation and implications for marriage patterns.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (79) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/324390 main text (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:1:p:181-214
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Series data maintained by Journals Division ().