Lobbying Legislatures

Morten Bennedsen and Sven Feldmann

Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol. 110, issue 4, 919-948

Abstract: We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic formation of policy coalitions among high-demand districts and the exclusion of low-demand districts. This increases the incentive to provide information about districts' demand relative to a legislature in which the governing coalition is fixed.

Date: 2002
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Related works:
Working Paper: LOBBYING LEGISLATURES (2000)
Working Paper: Lobbying Legislatures (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:4:p:919-948

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