Districting and Government Overspending

Reza Baqir

Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol. 110, issue 6, 1318-1354

Abstract: Theories of government spending driven by a common-pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that, when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for, greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity. The results also show that at-large electoral systems do not, and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do, break this relationship.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:6:p:1318-1354

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