Modes of Communication

Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole

Journal of Political Economy, 2005, vol. 113, issue 6, 1217-1238

Abstract: The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender's and receiver's motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on communication strategies, (ii) the relative influence and the complementarity/substitutability between issue-relevant communication and cues (information that relates to the credibility of the sender rather than to the issue at stake), and (iii) the path dependency of communication.

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (124)

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Working Paper: Modes of Communication (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:113:y:2005:i:6:p:1217-1238

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