Returns to Acquirers and Competition in the Acquisition Market: The Case of Banking

Christopher James and Peggy Wier

Journal of Political Economy, 1987, vol. 95, issue 2, 355-70

Abstract: In this paper the authors examine the effect of competition in the market for bank acquisitions on the acquirers' stock returns. Bank acquisitions are examined because federal and state regulations greatly facilitate the identification of potential bidders and alter native targets in an acquisition. They find that the gain to acquirers is positively related to the number of alternative target firms available and negatively related to the number of other potential bidders. These results provide some insights into the sources of gains from bank acquisitions. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1987
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261459 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:95:y:1987:i:2:p:355-70

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().