The Dissipation of Profits by Brand Name Investment and Entry when Price Guarantees Quality

William P Rogerson

Journal of Political Economy, 1987, vol. 95, issue 4, 797-809

Abstract: Two previous models of the dissipation of profits generated by the use of quality-guaranteeing prices assumed that pro fits were dissipated through investment in brand-name capital and ent ry. The model of this paper allows both possibilities. It is shown th at both types of dissipation will, in general, occur and that brand-n ame investment will dissipate a greater share of profits as the elast icity of consumer response to brand-name investment grows larger. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1987
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261486 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:95:y:1987:i:4:p:797-809

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().