Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?

Lott, John R,

Journal of Political Economy, 1987, vol. 95, issue 6, 1307-16

Abstract: This paper shows that allowing wealthy individuals to influence the outcome of their trials through the purchase of legal services can be consistent with the optimal penalty literature. Using this analysis, the author reviews some of the advantages and disadvantages of varying the length of jail terms versus varying the probability of conviction. Finally, implications for the bail, prosecutorial, and plea bargaining systems are examined. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1987
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