Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies

Sudipto Bhattacharya and J Luis Guasch

Journal of Political Economy, 1988, vol. 96, issue 4, 867-81

Abstract: Tournament contracts are characterized that simultaneously elicit first-best efficient effort levels and self -selection of risk-neutral heterogeneous workers into ability-specific contracts. Comparisons across self-selected ability types are shown to be sometimes necessary to attain efficiency. Rationales are explored for not commonly observing such contracts in hierarchical organizations. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1988
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