An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation Limiting Congressional Campaign Expenditures

Bruce Bender

Journal of Political Economy, 1988, vol. 96, issue 5, 1005-21

Abstract: Congressional voting on proposed floor amendments concerned solely with setting the level of the election campaign expenditure ceiling provision of the House Administration Committee's broad campaign finance reform bill of 1974 is analyzed for consistency with either the public-interest or economic theories of regulation. The benefit or cost to the individual congressman of a given ceiling is defined as the implied increase or decrease in his probability of reelection under the ceiling. Logit regression analysis provides the preponderant support for the economic theory of regulation by indicating that the likelihood of voting for a given ceiling varies directly with the implied change in reelection probability under the ceiling and is quite sensitive to the implied change. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261573 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:96:y:1988:i:5:p:1005-21

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().