Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation

William P Rogerson

Journal of Political Economy, 1989, vol. 97, issue 6, 1284-1305

Abstract: This paper argues that regulatory institutions in defense procurement are (and necessarily must be) organized to create prizes for innovation in the form of positive economic profit on production contracts. This has a number of important policy implications. The values of the prizes on twelve major aerospace projects are estimated using stock-market data and are shown to be large. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261654 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:6:p:1284-1305

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().