Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results

Donald Wittman

Journal of Political Economy, 1989, vol. 97, issue 6, 1395-1424

Abstract: By applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis, the author argues that democratic markets work as well as economic markets. In particular, he shows that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal-agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1989
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