Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts

Keith B Leffler and Randal R Rucker

Journal of Political Economy, 1991, vol. 99, issue 5, 1060-87

Abstract: A transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump-sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber-harvesting contracts. Predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from North Carolina. The empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk-based model. The transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1991
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