Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty
Rajesh Singh and
Quinn Weninger ()
Marine Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 30, issue 1, 97 - 119
Regulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the fishing ground. These regulations can exact significant social costs in commercial fisheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade bycatch management policy. Harvest of a target fish species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and harvesting efficiency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea observability of bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest that precise implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable and trade in fish quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading raises bycatch relative to a no-trade environment. The results offer useful guidance for designing cap-and-trade bycatch management programs.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
Working Paper: Cap-and-trade bycatch management with costly avoidance and stock uncertainty (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:mresec:doi:10.1086/679461
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Marine Resource Economics from University of Chicago Press
Series data maintained by Journals Division ().