Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution

Jordi Guillen, Claire Macher, Mathieu Merzéréaud, Jean Boncoeur and Olivier Guyader

Marine Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 30, issue 2, 123 - 138

Abstract: Most fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/679970 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/679970 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:mresec:doi:10.1086/679970

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Marine Resource Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().