Resource Rent and its Distribution in Iceland’s Fisheries

Stefan B. Gunnlaugsson, Hörður Saevaldsson, Dadi M. Kristofersson and Sveinn Agnarsson

Marine Resource Economics, 2020, vol. 35, issue 2, 113 - 135

Abstract: This article provides an estimate of resource rent creation and its distribution in Icelandic fisheries, which have been administered by an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system for almost three decades. This study examined the period from 1997 to 2017. Little rent was produced in the first years; however, since 2008, rent has been significant, averaging 380 million USD per year, which is around 17% of the export value of the fishing industry. Approximately 20% of the rent went to the public due to a special fishing fee and through corporate taxes. The remainder was evenly split between those who originally acquired their fishing rights by grandfathering but have cashed in their windfall gains and traded their quotas, hereinafter referred to as quota sellers, and the companies working in the fishing industry, each receiving around 40% of the rent.

Date: 2020
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