Explaining the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law: A New Insight

Nuno Garoupa

Supreme Court Economic Review, 2017, vol. 25, issue 1, 111 - 122

Abstract: Legal economists have explained the standard of proof in criminal law by exploring the asymmetry between social costs of false negatives (acquitting guilty defendants) and false positives (convicting innocent defendants). In a recent article, a model of punitive preferences (individuals with stronger-than-average punishment preferences) was introduced to explain police behavior, law enforcement, and rules of criminal procedure. We extend that model to provide for a new explanation for a more demanding standard of proof in criminal law without relying on exogenous assumptions about the social cost of false negatives and false positives.

Date: 2017
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