Fee-Screen Reimbursement and Physician Fee Inflation

Donald E. Yett,, William Der, Richard L. Ernst and Joel Hay

Journal of Human Resources, 1985, vol. 20, issue 2, 278-291

Abstract: Empirical tests of the physician fee-screen inflation hypothesis are applied to insurance claims data for three Blue Shield plans for 1973 to 1978. A framework for physician pricing behavior is developed, which includes a two-period model of inflationary pricing based on fee-screen updating, and some alternatives, including a myopic (single-period) price formulation model. Each of these models is shown to be a testable parameter subset of the general estimation equation. The results generally conform with the fee-screen inflation hypothesis, suggesting that the current Medicare and Blue Shield UCR physician reimbursement systems encourage excessive price increases.

Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:20:y:1985:i:2:p:278-291

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