Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes

Randall Eberts, Kevin Hollenbeck and Joe Stone

Journal of Human Resources, 2002, vol. 37, issue 4, 913-927

Abstract: Although merit pay systems have been established in many school districts across the United States, little empirical evidence exists concerning their influence on student achievement. This paper reviews that evidence and presents case study evidence from a county where one high school piloted a merit pay system to reward student retention while another comparable high school maintained a traditional compensation system. A difference-in-differences analysis implies that merit pay increased retention, had no effect on grade point averages, reduced average daily attendance rates, and increased the percentage of students who failed.

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes (2000)
Working Paper: Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes
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