Informal Care and the Division of End-of-Life Transfers

Meta Brown

Journal of Human Resources, 2006, vol. 41, issue 1

Abstract: Unmarried parents in the AHEAD study derive the majority of their longterm care hours from their children, and childcaregivers are generally unpaid. This paper examines the extent to which the division of end-of-life transfers compensates caregiving children. In a model of siblings’ altruistic contribution of care to a shared parent, the parent’s estate division is found to influence total family care, even where care contingencies are unenforced. Evidence in the AHEAD data that end-of-life transfers favor both current and expected caregivers, and that children make altruistic but resourceconstrained caregiving decisions, is consistent with a theory of estate division in which planned end-of-life transfers elicit care from altruistic children.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:41:y:2006:i:1:p191-219

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