Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in Brazil

Braz Camargo (), Rafael Camelo, Sergio Firpo and Vladimir Ponczek

Journal of Human Resources, 2018, vol. 53, issue 2, 414-444

Abstract: We use a discontinuity on the test score disclosure rule for the National Secondary Education Examination in Brazil to test whether test score disclosure affects student performance in public and private schools. We find that the impact of test score disclosure on student performance differs between public and private schools. Our results suggest that this difference is driven by differences in the market incentives faced by these two types of school.

Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.53.2.0115-6868R1
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:53:y:2018:i:2:p:414-444

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