Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law

Suresh Naidu and Eric A. Posner

Journal of Human Resources, 2022, vol. 57, issue S, s284-s323

Abstract: Recent literature has suggested that antitrust regulation is an appropriate response to labor market monopsony. This article qualifies the primacy of antitrust by arguing that a significant degree of labor market power is “frictional,” that is, without artificial barriers to entry or excessive concentration of employment. If monopsony is pervasive under conditions of laissez-faire, antitrust is likely to play only a partial role in remedying it, and other legal and policy instruments to intervene in the labor market will be required.

JEL-codes: J42 K21 K31 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.0219-10030R1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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