Incentive Effects of Some Pure and Mixed Transfer Systems

Michael C. Barth and David Greenberg

Journal of Human Resources, 1971, vol. 6, issue 2, 149-170

Abstract: This article argues that the existence of a wage subsidy as the sole component of an income transfer system is both unlikely and undesirable. A mixed wage subsidy-public assistance program is defined. Using traditional analysis and new graphical methods developed in the article, the effects on labor supply of the mixed system are compared to those of a negative income tax and of a wage subsidy not augmented by other transfers. For certain reasonable sets of wage rates and hours of work, the work incentive advantage generally attributed to a wage subsidy disappears when that program is realistically defined. The range over which the conclusions are apt to be relevant is illustrated in an Appendix.

Date: 1971
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/144914
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:6:y:1971:i:2:p:149-170

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Human Resources from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().