Hospital Insurance and Moral Hazard

Hyman Joseph

Journal of Human Resources, 1972, vol. 7, issue 2, 152-161

Abstract: Cross-section data are used to determine the effect of third-party payments on the length of stay in a hospital for 22 separate illnesses or conditions, thereby providing a test of the effect of third-party payments on resource allocation to hospitals. Also, estimates are made of price elasticities of demand for the separate illnesses or conditions. This study, by discovering patterns of behavior among medical categories that have been obscured in aggregate demand studies, has important implications regarding the existence and extent of "moral hazard," the effectiveness of coinsurance, and the effect of extended-care facilities on resource allocation.

Date: 1972
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:7:y:1972:i:2:p:152-161

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