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Spatial Bioinvasion Externalities with Heterogeneous Landowner Preferences: A Two-Agent Bioeconomic Model

Shady S. Atallah

Land Economics, 2025, vol. 101, issue 2

Abstract: Preference heterogeneity among landowners managing transboundary resources can determine the production of externalities across their lands. I test this hypothesis in the context of an invasive species affecting two forest landowners, where one values their property for recreation and the other produces timber. Using a spatially explicit first-mover repeated game, I find that the social cost of the externality is greatest when a bioinvasion starts on the recreation property. Except for species with fast long-distance dispersal, the optimal subsidy is nonuniform, targeting the landowner who acts as the weaker link, regardless of where a bioinvasion starts.

JEL-codes: Q23 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
Note: DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/le.101.2.112024-0209
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