A Welfare Gain from Switching to Taxes? The Danish Cod Fishery in the Kattegat

Frank Jensen, Lars Hansen and Rasmus Nielsen

Land Economics, 2024, vol. 100, issue 2, 353-369

Abstract: Theoretical papers show that there could be a welfare gain from switching to tax regulation if managers are more uncertain about key parameters of a fishery than fishers. We estimate the size of the welfare gain that would result if a manager of the Danish cod fishery in the Kattegat switched from the current individual transferable quota system to tax regulation. We find that this would generate a small welfare gain of 0.023% of the industry profit and variations in parameter values (± 20%) at most result in a gain of 0.039%.

JEL-codes: Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
Note: DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/le.100.2.052521-0054R2
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:100:y:2024:i:2:p:353-369

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