Risk Aversion, Risk Sharing, and Joint Bidding: A Study of Outer Continental Shelf Petroleum Auctions

Steven W. Millsaps and Mack Ott

Land Economics, 1985, vol. 64, issue 4, 372-386

Abstract: Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a ...

Date: 1985
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