Sky Islands, Squirrels, and Scopes: The Political Economy of an Environmental Conflict

Thomas C. Rhodes and Paul N. Wilson

Land Economics, 1995, vol. 71, issue 1, 106-121

Abstract: Siting conflicts involving endangered species create economic and political pressures on existing property rules. A welfare model of institutional change with endogenous transaction costs is used to analytically describe the environmental conflict surrounding the Mount Graham International Observatory project. Emphasis is placed on the evolution of property rights under conditions of imperfect information. This case study illustrates (a) the nature of scientific and economic incentives for institutional change due to technological innovation and (b) the process of institutional choice in a policy environment characterized by biological uncertainty and economic power.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3146762
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:71:y:1995:i:1:p:106-121

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Land Economics from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().