Wage-Homestead Tenancies: Technological Dualism and Tenant Household Size

Andrew W. Horowitz

Land Economics, 1996, vol. 72, issue 3, 370-380

Abstract: A widespread but little-studied tenancy in the developing world entails the exchange of labor for access to a homestead and a wage. This paper models two distinguishing features of this tenancy: technological dualism between the landlord's and tenants' plot, and landlord preferences over tenant household size. When wages are time denominated, moral hazard may provide incentive for landlords to resist innovation on the homestead. Landlords are shown to prefer larger tenant households under a time wage than under piece-rate. I argue that landlord preferences over tenant household size may have important effects that are ignored in the literature.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3147203
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:72:y:1996:i:3:p:370-380

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Land Economics from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().