Institutions and Externalities in the Inland Fisheries of Bangladesh

Kazi Toufique

Land Economics, 1998, vol. 74, issue 3, 409-421

Abstract: Establishment of property rights over inland fisheries of Bangladesh has been able to internalize appropriation externalities. However, the agents have failed to internalize provision problems due to the physical characteristics of the resource systems. We have observed that the rules traditionally followed by the fishers are maintained and preserved by agents having exclusive property rights over the resource systems. The relationship between the agents and the fishers is not anonymous but of a patron-client type. Such outcome does not follow from the analysis of those who think that private property rights are the only solution to common-pool problems.

JEL-codes: Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Journal Article: Institutions and Externalities in the Inland Fisheries of Bangladesh (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:74:y:1998:i:3:p:409-421

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