Managing Multiple Activities in a National Park

Robert Turner

Land Economics, 2000, vol. 76, issue 3, 473-485

Abstract: This paper uses the theory of club goods to derive efficiency conditions for managing multiple activities in a national park. The park jointly provides recreational activities for visitors and wilderness, a pure public good. The implications for user fees, self-financing of the park, and prohibition of particular activites are derived. Separate tolls should be charged for each activity; with efficient activity tolls, no entrance fee is needed. Glacier National Park is used to show that, in order to apply the theoretical rules, park managers need more information than is currently available.

JEL-codes: Q26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:76:y:2000:i:3:p:473-485

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