Sunk Cost and Entry-Exit Decisions under Individual Transferable Quotas: Why Industry Restructuring Is Delayed

Niels Vestergaard, Frank Jensen () and Henning P. Jørgensen

Land Economics, 2005, vol. 81, issue 3

Abstract: The paper shows that explicit modelling of sunk cost and a firm’s entry-exit decision in a traditional deterministic investment model may give an explanation of the slow transition to the optimal fleet structure following the introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The analysis shows that the annual lease unit price of quota may be in a range where the long-run fleet structure will not be attainable at once. Over time, firms with zero gross investment as optimal behavior may leave the industry as the capital decays and over the transition period the optimal fleet structure prevails.

JEL-codes: Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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