Rent-Seeking in Invasive Species Regulation: The Case of Noxious Weeds

He Min, Munisamy Gopinath, Steven T. Buccola and Peter B. McEvoy

Land Economics, 2008, vol. 84, issue 2, 306-326

Abstract: Many non-native weed pests of food, fiber, and nursery crops pose threats to the U.S. environment and agriculture. We focus on regulations controlling the spread of noxious weeds, and especially the determinants of regulatory differences across U.S. states. With a simple game-theoretic framework, we derive cross-state regulatory congruence as a function of ecological and agronomic characteristics and stakeholder lobbying through political contributions. Empirical results suggest ecological and agronomic dissimilarities drive large cross-state differences in noxious weed regulation. However, evidence of stakeholder interests is statistically and economically significant. Unlike in the seed industry, commodity producers do not favor regulatory uniformity.

JEL-codes: H73 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/84/2/306
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:84:y:2008:i:2:p:306-326

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Land Economics from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().