Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards

Anne Johannesen () and Anders Skonhoft ()

Land Economics, 2009, vol. 85, issue 4, 637-654

Abstract: This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ outcome.

JEL-codes: Q24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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