Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform

Ann L. Brower, Philip Meguire and Adrian Monks

Land Economics, 2010, vol. 86, issue 3

Abstract: This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees’ desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from "bureaucratic coping," or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem.

JEL-codes: K11 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:86:y:2010:iii:1:p467-492

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