L’Étranger: Status, Property Rights, and Investment Incentives in Côte d’Ivoire

James Fenske

Land Economics, 2010, vol. 86, issue 4

Abstract: his study uses data from Côte d’Ivoire to show that "outsider" households have relatively small land holdings and less complete rights over land than locals. It then demonstrates a link between property rights and investment incentives by looking at the decision to leave land fallow. "Outsiders" fallow a smaller proportion of their land, indicating that their farms are left uncultivated for shorter periods. This is only partly explained by their incomplete property rights and relative land-poverty. These differences in investment patterns lead to lower yields per hectare.

JEL-codes: O12 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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