Collective Action for Local Commons Management in Rural Yunnan, China: Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Game Theory

Junichi Ito

Land Economics, 2012, vol. 88, issue 1, 181-200

Abstract: This paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management, with the help of evolutionary game theory. Data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural Yunnan, China. An econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided, the degree of income disparity is quite small, and resource restrictions are moderately problematic. The finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders.

JEL-codes: O13 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:88:y:2012:i:1:p:181-200

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