The Implications of Environmental NGO Involvement in Fisheries Management

Margrethe Aanesen and Claire W. Armstrong

Land Economics, 2014, vol. 90, issue 3

Abstract: What happens when an environmental NGO (ENGO) becomes involved in fisheries management, and its involvement is recognized by the managing authorities? The answer depends on the preferences and the measures of the ENGO. We use a bioeconomic objective function where fishers and regulator have ecological, economic, and social preferences, whereas the ENGO has only ecological preferences. Applying a Cournot model we analyze how the original regulation of the authorities is affected when an ENGO becomes involved. We use empirical data on fisheries stakeholder preferences and from the Portuguese and Spanish sardine purse seine fishery to calibrate and test the model.

JEL-codes: Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/90/3/560
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:90:y:2014:iii:1:p:560-573

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Land Economics from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().