Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations

Dmytro Sokolovskyi () and Olena Sokolovska

Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe, 2015, vol. 23, issue 3, 47-70

Abstract: Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity.

Keywords: investors; government; economic behavior; modeling; game theory; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:jmbace:v:23:y:2015:i:3:p:47-70:n:4

DOI: 10.7206/mba.ce.2084-3356.150

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