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State Autonomy in Shaping Tax Policies: Facts and Myths Based on the Situation in OECD Countries

Tomkiewicz Jacek () and Postuła Marta ()
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Tomkiewicz Jacek: Kozminski University,59 Jagiellonska St., 03-301Warsaw, Poland
Postuła Marta: University of Warsaw,1/3 Szturmowa St., 03-678Warszawa, Poland

Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe, 2020, vol. 28, issue 2, 83-97

Abstract: Purpose: Capital flows, tax competition, multinational companies and tax havens weakens governments’ ability to lead independent tax policy. This race to the bottom, especially in the case of CIT rate, seems to work. Aim of the text is to show that the governments are not as powerless as it is often claimed. Despite common opinion, nation­states retain a relatively significant autonomy in creating their own fiscal policies, including tax instruments. Size of funds kept in tax havens have not been growing for few years and international cooperation of tax authorities is more and more efficient in dealing with the tax fraud.

Keywords: tax competition; tax autonomy of states; tax havens; tax policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 H10 H20 K34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:jmbace:v:28:y:2020:i:2:p:83-97:n:5

DOI: 10.7206/cemj.2658-0845.23

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