Orderly marketing for oranges: Public interest versus private interest

Nicholas J. Powers
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Nicholas J. Powers: Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC, Postal: Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC

Agribusiness, 1994, vol. 10, issue 1, 61-82

Abstract: The consequences of three rules arguably consistent with the orderly marketing objective of Federal marketing orders for managing weekly product flows of navel oranges are empirically examined. Regardless of whether the rules are executed in an environment of certainty or uncertainty, growers always gain from revenue maximization, handlers are unaffected, buyers always gain from constant prices, and net social welfare is always slightly larger for constant prices. Buyers never gain from stable product flows. Growers gain from using a more information-intensive decision making policy under uncertainty only when following the revenue maximization rule. Buyers, by contrast, always gain from the more information-intensive decision-making policy under uncertainty, regardless of the rule.

Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:agribz:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:61-82

DOI: 10.1002/1520-6297(199401)10:1<61::AID-AGR2720100107>3.0.CO;2-9

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