Pesticide residues in food: The delaney clause and global harmonization of pesticide standards

Alexander R. Nemajovsky and Terence Centner
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Alexander R. Nemajovsky: Department of Agricultural Economics, The University of Georgia, Athens, Postal: Department of Agricultural Economics, The University of Georgia, Athens

Agribusiness, 1991, vol. 7, issue 3, 187-196

Abstract: Phytosanitary regulations as barriers to international trade and their infringement upon the objectives of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade has proven to be a troublesome issue. Phytosanitary regulations governing pesticide residues pursuant to a US federal legislative provision known as the Delaney Clause may constitute barriers to trade. The policy of a zero tolerance level for carcinogens in certain foods may preclude acceptance of Codex Alimentarius limits, although the two systems of regulation are not inconsistent in themselves. This article analyzes the Delaney Clause and a recent modification to Delaney that gives the US an additional policy basis from which to seek a global harmonization of pesticide standards. Such a harmonization could perhaps best be accomplished through the Codex Alimentarius system using the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the mechanism for implementation.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:agribz:v:7:y:1991:i:3:p:187-196

DOI: 10.1002/1520-6297(199105)7:3<187::AID-AGR2720070302>3.0.CO;2-J

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