Shaming, stringency, and shirking: Evidence from food‐safety inspections

John Bovay

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2025, vol. 107, issue 1, 152-180

Abstract: This paper examines the responses of chicken producers to public disclosure of quality information (or categorization) regarding Salmonella in chicken carcasses. Producers exert effort to attain better categorization and shirk when failing to meet the thresholds required for better categorization. Public disclosure reduces this shirking effect. However, some producers shirk even under public disclosure when the threshold for disclosure is too stringent. The results suggest that the most effective quality disclosure policies would either disclose continuous (noncategorical) information or impose fines or other sanctions on producers attaining the poorest quality.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12480

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:ajagec:v:107:y:2025:i:1:p:152-180

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