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Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000

Jason M. Roberts and Steven S. Smith

American Journal of Political Science, 2003, vol. 47, issue 2, 305-317

Abstract: In this article, we provide a critical review of the evidence and arguments about party polarization in the House of Representatives during the late 20th century. We show that inferences about party polarization are significantly affected by voting reform in the early 1970s. We observe that a decomposed roll‐call record alters our view of the timing of changes in party polarization and therefore requires that we reconsider explanations of the trend. We revisit explanations of party polarization and establish a strong case for placing substantial emphasis on party strategies in explanations of party polarization in floor behavior during the 1980s and 1990s.

Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00021

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:47:y:2003:i:2:p:305-317

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