A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility

David Thunder

American Journal of Political Science, 2006, vol. 50, issue 3, 676-690

Abstract: In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so‐called “duty of civility” ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the “duty of civility,” which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00209.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:50:y:2006:i:3:p:676-690

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