Reputation and Interstate Conflict

Mark J. C. Crescenzi

American Journal of Political Science, 2007, vol. 51, issue 2, 382-396

Abstract: In international politics, states learn from the behavior of other nations, including the reputations states form through their actions in the international system. This article presents a model of how states process this information and examines how this learning affects international conflict. The model builds off of cognitive balance theory and foreign policy learning models and breaks new ground in its ability to provide a contextual assessment of reputation in world politics. The article then investigates whether a dyad is more likely to experience conflict if at least one state has a reputation for hostility. This hypothesis is tested empirically across all dyads in the international system from 1817 to 2000. The results indicate that states do engage in this learning behavior and that the information generated by extra‐dyadic interaction of states has a significant bearing upon the likelihood of dyadic conflict.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00257.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:51:y:2007:i:2:p:382-396

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