The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics

Songying Fang

American Journal of Political Science, 2008, vol. 52, issue 2, 304-321

Abstract: Why did President Bush attempt to acquire a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force before the war with Iraq, even though there was a substantial risk that his request would be rejected? This article presents a game‐theoretic model to investigate how international institutions can shape the behavior of democratic leaders by influencing domestic politics. While it seems unsurprising that unbiased leaders who are truly concerned about foreign policy outcomes would consult international institutions, the results show that biased leaders with private agendas can also be forced to behave like the unbiased type because of their electoral concerns. The equilibrium results are illustrated with the cases of U.S. use of force in international crises.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00314.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:52:y:2008:i:2:p:304-321

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