Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993
Benjamin Nyblade and
Steven R. Reed
American Journal of Political Science, 2008, vol. 52, issue 4, 926-941
Abstract:
When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician “selling” influence while cheating involves a politician “buying” votes. Individual‐level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating.
Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00351.x
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:52:y:2008:i:4:p:926-941
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