Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation

Thomas T. Holyoke

American Journal of Political Science, 2009, vol. 53, issue 2, 360-375

Abstract: This article investigates how interest group competition, a state of conflicting policy preferences stemming from how organizational memberships are defined, can resolve into conflict or cooperation. The strategic choices of competing lobbyists are modeled as the results of a trade‐off between the need to represent members and please legislators, and the additional advocacy resources they hope to gain by agreeing to form coalitions with their competitors rather than fight them in resource‐draining conflicts. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested with data from interviews with lobbyists on six issues taken up by the U.S. Congress from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that while group members do have some limited power to constrain the policy positions taken on issues by their lobbyists, it is primarily the pressures from legislators and competitor groups that push lobbyists into collectively supporting coalition positions different from those desired by their members.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00375.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:360-375

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